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I. INTRODUCTIONTHIS Article provides an update of case law and legislative efforts
that have had, or will have, an impact on franchise and dealership
law in Texas and the Fifth Circuit. This update provides an over-
view of developments and opinions during the Survey period, but it is not
an exhaustive reference for all cases regarding franchises and dealerships
during the Survey period. Notably, this was not a year of significant deci-
sions but rather a year in which courts reminded businesses and counsel
that the plain meaning of the words in contracts between the parties is
important in deciding franchise and distribution disputes.
II. FRANCHISE BASICS
Franchisors continued to adjust to the amended Federal Trade Com-
mission Franchise Rule' during the Survey period, but there were no sig-




The first issue a court normally considers in a case is jurisdiction-
whether the court has the authority to hear the dispute. Several state and
federal courts addressed this issue during the Survey period. In Bellfort
Enterprises Inc. v. PetroTex Fuels Inc.,2 the plaintiff challenged the district
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court's refusal to remand the action to state court after arguing that the
federal court did not have federal-question jurisdiction. Plaintiff Bellfort,
who sold motor fuel and conducted automotive repairs, had a dealer mar-
keting contract with defendant PetroTex, which supplied the motor fuel.
Although the parties had a dealer marketing contract that constituted a
franchise agreement pursuant to the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act
(PMPA), 3 Bellfort argued that PetroTex did not provide certain incen-
tives promised under the franchise agreement4 and overcharged for fuel. 5
After Bellfort filed its lawsuit in Texas state court, PetroTex removed the
suit to federal district court and filed counterclaims against Bellfort and
its owner, Soon Yim.
Bellfort and Yim challenged the removal by arguing that the case did
not contain a federal question.6 As it is well known, lower federal courts
(i.e., district courts) have limited jurisdiction, and the plaintiff must estab-
lish that the district court has the power to hear a particular action. Be-
cause subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or agreed to between
the parties, the plaintiff must show that jurisdiction is based on federal-
question jurisdiction, diversity jurisdiction, or another basis authorized by
a federal statute, the U.S. Constitution, or a U.S. treaty.
In its initial order, the district court granted Bellfort and Yim's motion
for remand for lack of federal-question jurisdiction.7 On rehearing, the
district court vacated its initial order and held that "jurisdiction was
proper because the PMPA preempted Bellfort's state law claims."8 As
the action continued in federal district court, PetroTex moved for sum-
mary judgment, and the district court granted the motion for summary
judgment in PetroTex's favor. Bellfort and Yim appealed.9 The only is-
sue that the Fifth Circuit addressed was whether federal subject-matter
jurisdiction existed.' 0
PetroTex had used the "well-pleaded complaint" rule to establish that
federal-question jurisdiction existed." Relying on particular statements
from Bellfort's complaint, Bellfort alleged that PetroTex terminated the
franchise agreement. PetroTex, therefore, concluded that Bellfort's
claims fell under the PMPA, which was "designed to protect franchisees
from arbitrary and discriminatory termination or nonrenewal of a
franchise."12
The Fifth Circuit used two well-known concepts to resolve this jurisdic-
tional question: (i) the "well-pleaded complaint rule," and (ii) the "artful







10. Id. at 418.
11. Id.
12. Id. (quoting Kostantas v. Exxon Co., 663 F.2d 605, 606 (5th Cir. 1981)).
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pleading doctrine."13 The Fifth Circuit noted that "[tlhe well-pleaded
complaint rule provides that 'a federal court has original or removal juris-
diction only if a federal question appears on the face of the plaintiffs well-
pleaded complaint' and that 'there is no federal jurisdiction if the plaintiff
properly pleads only a state law cause of action.'"14 The Fifth Circuit
further noted that the artful pleading doctrine does not allow a plaintiff
to hide a federal question (and defeat removal) if the plaintiff has pled in
a way to "artfully avoid[] any suggestion of a federal issue."' 5
In its analysis, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Bellfort's complaint did
not invoke the protections of the PMPA.16 The Fifth Circuit found that,
although Bellfort partly sought a declaratory judgment that its franchise
agreement with PetroTex was terminated, Bellfort's only intent was to
assert a breach of contract claim.17 The court noted that Bellfort's re-
quested relief was "inconsistent with an argument that PetroTex had al-
ready terminated the franchise agreement."s18
In TGI Friday's Inc. v. Great Northwest Restaurants, Inc.,19 several
franchisees challenged whether they were amenable to personal jurisdic-
tion in Texas. As further discussed below, Friday's filed a trademark in-
fringement action against several franchisees when they failed to cease
use of Friday's trademarks and service marks after termination of eleven
franchise agreements. Pursuant to the franchise agreements, defendants
operated TGI Friday's restaurants in California, Oregon, and
Washington.20
Friday's is a New York corporation with its principal place of business
in Carrollton, Texas. Defendants are located in several states. Defendant
Great Northwest Restaurants, Inc., a Washington corporation with its
principal place of business in California, operated four restaurants in
Washington and one in Oregon. Defendant PRC Restaurants, Inc., a
Washington corporation with its principal place of business in California,
operated one restaurant in Washington. California corporations TGIA
Restaurants, Inc. and Ten Forward Dining, Inc. were assignees of five
franchise agreements for five restaurants in California. 21 Defendants first
challenged personal jurisdiction.22
Because Friday's operates and franchises restaurants throughout the
United States, "[e]ach franchise agreement contain[ed] an identical or
nearly identical provision, in capital letters and bold font, addressing
13. Id.






19. 652 F. Supp. 2d 750 (N.D. Tex. 2009).





choice of law, jurisdiction, and venue" in Texas. 23 The franchise agree-
ments also provided that "franchisee and principals each irrevocably ac-
cept[ed] and submit[ted] to the jurisdiction of the courts of the State of
Texas and the federal courts located in Dallas County, Texas" for disputes
relating to the agreements. 24 Despite these provisions, defendants ar-
gued that they did not have sufficient "minimum contacts" with Texas to
confer personal jurisdiction. Although the district court agreed with de-
fendants' contention that entering into the franchise agreements did not
automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts, 25 the district court
looked at the circumstances, such as negotiations and circumstances of
the contract, to determine whether defendants had purposefully estab-
lished minimum contacts. The district court held that defendants had not
only established their minimum contacts through their course of dealing,
but that defendants had "extensive" contacts with Texas.26 Defendants
entered into eleven, twenty-year franchise agreements with Friday's. De-
fendants' principals engaged in extensive negotiations via face-to-face,
telephone, and email communications in Texas. Defendants' principals
traveled to Texas on several occasions to discuss legal aspects, operations,
and termination. Defendants' representatives attended annual training in
Texas. Defendants sent their payments to Texas, and Friday's support to
defendants came from Texas. Defendants did not dispute these facts.
Based on Friday's undisputed evidence, the district court concluded
that defendants "purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of con-
ducting activities in Texas, and that defendants certainly should have rea-
sonably anticipated being haled into court in Texas." 27 The district court
denied defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 28
In Qassas v. Daylight Donut Flour Co., LLC, 2 9 the district court ad-
dressed personal jurisdiction related to a marketing representative agree-
ment for a donut shop licensor. Latif Qassas (a Sugarland, Texas,
resident) and Daylight (which has at least thirty-five donut stores that do
business under the Daylight name) entered into an international market-
ing representative agreement in 2006. Pursuant to the agreement, Qassas
agreed to "acquire new clients internationally, train and open new inter-
national stores, and [complete] the international contracts."30 Qassas re-
ceived a commission for food and equipment purchases plus a training
fee. 31
Through a letter to Qassas's home, Daylight terminated the representa-
tive agreement in July 2008. Oassas sued Daylight in Harris County,
23. Id. at 755.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 757 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 758.
28. Id.
29. No. 4:09-CV-0208, 2009 WL 1795004 (S.D. Tex. June 24, 2009).




Texas, and Daylight removed the action to the Southern District of Texas.
Daylight moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Daylight
claimed that it did not have any Texas "offices, warehouses, or facili-
ties."32 Also, Daylight claimed that it did not have Texas employees or
agents. Daylight described its international and domestic donut shops,
including the thirty-five in Texas, as "'customers' of Daylight with whom
it ha[d] 'limited license agreements.' 3 3 The limited license agreement
allowed Daylight's "customers" to use the Daylight name, receive a pro-
tected territory, and purchase Daylight's raw products. The only fee that
Daylight received was for purchase of the materials-no franchise fees,
no percentage of sales, and no payment from the sales of its customers'
products. Daylight also claimed that it did not support, manage, or inter-
fere with its customers' operations. 34
In evaluating general personal jurisdiction based on Daylight's pres-
ence in Texas, Daylight argued that the fact that it shipped materials to its
Texas customers constituted only doing business with Texas, not doing
business in Texas.35 Therefore, it was not subject to personal jurisdiction.
The district court agreed.36 It noted that Daylight did business with vari-
ous Texas companies, but that "those entities [were] independently
owned stores in Texas."37 Although Daylight granted licenses to Texas
store owners, the district court held that "Daylight [did] not receive any
royalties or percentages from the Texas stores."38
The district court similarly held that Daylight's website was not suffi-
cient to confer personal jurisdiction. 39 "Whether personal jurisdiction
can be constitutionally exercised over a defendant based on operation of
a website depends on the 'nature and quality of commercial activity that
an entity conducts over the Internet." 40 The court concluded that
Daylight's website content was "passive," which meant that it provided
only "general information about the company and information about
owning a Daylight store." 41 Although the website provided a store loca-
tor feature, online pre-application form, and an online store, the district
court held that the posted information was "merely a passive advertise-
ment." 42 Moreover, Qassas presented "no evidence pertaining to
Daylight's sales over the website, and thus no evidence of sales to Texas
residents." 43 Even considering Daylight's "contacts" in the aggregate,
the court held that these contacts were "not so substantial that [Daylight]
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at *2.
35. Id. at *3 (citing Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 716-
18 (5th Cir. 1999)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at *34.
39. Id. at *5.






'should have reasonably expected to be sued in Texas on any matter.'" 44
The district court also found that specific jurisdiction could not be es-
tablished. 45 The court concluded that Daylight's contacts and related
communications related to the representative agreement were insuffi-
cient.46 "[Mlinimum contacts cannot be established by 'merely con-
tracting." 47 Based on the evidence before the court, Qassas failed to
establish personal jurisdiction.48
DAVACO, Inc. v. Dunkin' Brands, Inc.4 9 was a personal jurisdiction
case involving the interplay between franchisor, franchisee, and a third-
party contractor. Dunkin' Brands hired DAVACO to perform construc-
tion services on Dunkin' Donuts stores throughout the United States.
For stores in Georgia and Maryland, DAVACO entered into contracts
with the franchisees. During the construction of the improvements for
the Georgia and Maryland franchisees, DAVACO alleged that it per-
formed additional work not provided for in the contract. Although
DAVACO alleged it performed the work, it asserted that the franchisees
refused to pay. DAVACO filed a suit, asserting breach of contract, negli-
gent misrepresentation, fraud, and unjust enrichment in Texas state court.
The defendant franchisees removed the action to federal court and
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.50
The parties engaged in considerable jurisdictional discovery. Based on
a contract theory, the district court held that DAVACO did not meet its
burden of proving that the franchisees availed themselves of Texas law.51
The district court concluded that "the evidence show[ed] that at least
some of the contracts were signed ... at [the franchisees'] stores in Mary-
land and Georgia," where the entirety of the work was performed. 52 The
court also held that telephone conversations, of which DAVACO offered
no specific details, would, at most, be considered "unilateral activity of
those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant."53 This
activity was not enough to satisfy the minimum-contacts requirement.
Therefore, the district court held that DAVACO failed to establish that
the Georgia and Maryland franchisees had exposed themselves to a law-
suit in Texas. 54
Personal jurisdiction based on a tort theory also failed.55 First, the dis-
trict court held that DAVACO failed to identify any specific misrepresen-






49. No. 3:08-cv-0581-M, 2008 WL 4975880 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2008).
50. Id. at *1.
51. Id. at *2.
52. Id.
53. Id. (quoting Hanson v. Penckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at *3.
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tation on which DAVACO relied.56 The district court noted that this
requirement was necessary for a fraud claim in federal court.57 The dis-
trict court also noted that DAVACO had failed to allege other elements
of a fraud claim, such as the falsity of any statement, or that the franchis-
ees were negligent in making any statement.58 DAVACO's claims were
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.59
During this Survey period, the Southern District of Texas reminded
practitioners of a few items relating to jurisdiction. In Ford Motor Co. v.
DeMontrond Lincoln Mercury Co.,60 the district court made its ruling on
the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction on only those claims
related to the Lanham Act. The district court noted that it had "clear"
subject-matter jurisdiction over the Lanham Act claims.61 Therefore,
even if an action includes claims under the Lanham Act (or any other
statute providing for federal-question jurisdiction), subject-matter juris-
diction is not automatically determined as to similarly pled and related
state-law claims. Furthermore, the district court may decide to bifurcate
its decision on those claims where it "clearly" has subject-matter
jurisdiction.
B. FORUM SELECTION
In TGI Friday's Inc. v. Great Northwest Restaurants, Inc., discussed
above, defendants also contended that Texas was an improper venue for
the action.62 Because Friday's asserted claims under the Lanham Act, the
district court held that "28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) control[led] where venue
[was] proper."63 Friday's had the burden to establish proper venue.
Friday's relied on § 1391(b)(2) to establish that venue was proper in
the Northern District of Texas because "a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim" occurred in that district.M Friday's
also relied on the forum selection clause in each of the franchise agree-
ments, which stated that the parties "agree that any claim, controversy or
dispute arising out of or relating to this agreement or the performance
thereof which cannot be amicably settled . . . shall be resolved by a pro-
ceeding in a court in Dallas County, Texas." 65
To determine applicability of the forum selection clause, the court
made a two-step determination: (1) whether Friday's claims fell within




59. Id. at *4.
60. No. H-09-3082, 2009 WL 3151306 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2009).
61. Id. at *1.
62. 652 F. Supp. 2d 750, 758 (N.D. Tex. Aug 20, 2009); see supra notes 24-28 and ac-
companying text.





tion clause was enforceable under the circumstances. 66 The district court
resolved both issues in the affirmative. 67 First, the court held that the
broad language of the clause-"arising out of or relating to [the franchise
agreements]"-encompassed Friday's claims. 68 Second, the court deter-
mined that Friday's four state and federal claims would be treated to-
gether because they were predicated on the same facts and issues.69
"When a party seeks dismissal of a case based on improper venue, a fo-
rum selection clause is presumed to be valid 'and should be enforced un-
less enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be "unreasonable"
under the circumstances."' 7 0 Defendants' only argument as to the en-
forceability of the forum selection clause was that it was void under Cali-
fornia law.7 1 Defendants provided no reason for applying California law.
Moreover, defendants did not show that enforcement of the forum selec-
tion clause would contravene Texas public policy. Because California law
did not apply, the district court held that it needed not consider whether
California law would be contravened. 72 Defendants did not show that
enforcement of the forum selection clause was unreasonable. Therefore,
the district court denied defendants' motion for improper venue.73
In Snaza v. Howard Johnson Franchise Systems, Inc.,74 the parents of
Duane Snaza brought a wrongful death action against defendants
StudentCity.com, Howard Johnson Franchise Systems, Inc., and Howard
Johnson International, Inc., after Snaza fell from his balcony on the tenth
floor of a Howard Johnson hotel in Mazatlan, Mexico. After StudentCity
removed the case from state to federal court, plaintiffs amended their
complaint, alleging that Howard Johnson was negligent regarding the
height of the hotel railing. Howard Johnson moved to dismiss for forum
non conveniens.75
The district court initially noted the standard for a motion for forum
non conveniens. "A defendant bears the burden of persuasion as to all
elements of the forum non conveniens analysis." 76 In deciding a motion
to dismiss, the "court first determines whether an alternate forum is avail-
able and adequate," then whether "the alternate forum is more conve-
nient for the litigants by weighing the various private and public interest
factors."77 Howard Johnson moved for the trial to be resolved in the
Mexican courts.78
66. Id. at 758-59.
67. Id. at 759-60.
68. Id. at 759.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 760 (quoting Int'l Software Sys., Inc. v. Aplicon, Inc., 77 F.3d 112, 114 (5th
Cir. 1996)).
71. Id. (citing CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 20040.5 (West 2008)).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. No. 3:07-CV-0495-0, 2008 WL 5383155 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 24, 2008).
75. Id. at *1.
76. Id. at *2.
77. Id. at *2-3.
78. Id. at *3.
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The district court first analyzed whether the Mexican courts were avail-
able, i.e., whether the entire case and all the parties could come within
the jurisdiction of that forum. Howard Johnson agreed to submit to the
Mexican court's jurisdiction. In addition, although there was some disa-
greement, both parties' experts agreed that the court would accept juris-
diction if both parties agreed to submit to the Mexican courts. Plaintiffs
objected to the magistrate judge's finding, because the magistrate judge
purportedly gave little weight to the plaintiffs' expert witness. For several
reasons, including the fact that plaintiffs' expert was a law professor, not
a licensed attorney, the district court agreed with the magistrate judge.79
The magistrate judge also found that the availability of the Mexican court
"[could] be assured by conditioning dismissal on the [Mexican court's]
willingness to hear the case."80 The district court agreed that the Mexi-
can court was an available forum.81
Likewise, the magistrate judge found that the Mexican court was ade-
quate because "the parties [would] not be deprived of all remedies or
treated unfairly, even though they may not enjoy the same benefits as
they might receive in an American court."8 2 Plaintiffs objected, asserting
that Mexican courts "lack procedural safeguards available in the United
States, no Mexican attorney would take plaintiffs' case on a contingency
fee basis, proceedings in Mexico would not be concluded within a reason-
able time frame, and the damages recoverable in Mexico would be very
limited." 83 The district court overruled plaintiffs' objection.84 Based on
Fifth Circuit and Texas Supreme Court authorities that had already ad-
dressed each of these issues, the district court held that a Mexican court
would be adequate.85
The district court then considered the magistrate judge's finding on
each of the public and private factors. After giving a strong deference to
plaintiffs' choice of forum, the district court considered the private factors
(i.e., "the relative ease of access to sources of proof; the availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the costs of ob-
taining attendance of willing, witnesses; the probability of an opportunity
to view the premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive") 86 and the public factors (i.e., "the administrative difficulties
flowing from court congestion; the local interest in having localized con-
troversies decided at home; the interest in having the trial of a diversity
case in a forum that is at home with the law that must govern the action;
the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the appli-
79. Id. at *5.
80. Id. at *4.
81. Id. at *6.
82. Id. at *8.
83. Id. at *9.
84. Id.
85. Id. at *12.
86. Id.
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cation of foreign law; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unre-
lated forum with jury duty").87 Notably, the district court observed that
while the accident took place in Mexico, some of the documents and wit-
nesses would be located in the United States.88 The court therefore con-
cluded that "it would be easier to access these [documents and witnesses]
by retaining jurisdiction ... in a United States court." 89 Also, the court
believed that a physical viewing of the hotel balcony would not be neces-
sary. 90 Based on advanced technology, "the parties and experts could
present photographs and video to the court and/or jury." 91
The district court determined that the private factors weighed in favor
of trying the case in the United States in Texas, and that the public factors
were neutral.92 In light of these findings, the district court held that How-
ard Johnson had failed to meet its burden of showing that the private and
public factors weighed in favor of the Mexican forum.93 Therefore, the
district court accepted in part and rejected in part the magistrate judge's
recommendation and sustained in part and overruled in part plaintiffs'
objections. 94 Based on the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and
in the interest of justice, the district court, sua sponte, transferred the
action to the District of Massachusetts-StudentCity's principal place of
business.95 Several private-interest factors influenced the district court's
decision-no documents or witnesses were located in Texas, numerous
witnesses were located in Massachusetts, and StudentCity's business, em-
ployees, management and business decisions were located in, and made
in, Massachusetts. 96 Other than the location of plaintiffs' attorneys,
which is not a factor to be considered, the case had no connection with
Texas. 97 Therefore, the district court directed the clerk to effect transfer
of the case to the District of Massachusetts. 98
C. ARBITRATION
In Cottman Transmission Systems, L.L.C. v. FVLR Enters., L.L.C, 99
discussed in detail below, franchisor Cottman argued that it was entitled
to have its dispute with the commercial landlord, FVLR, resolved by
binding arbitration. The Dallas Court of Appeals determined whether
Cottman had waived its right to arbitration.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at *13.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at *14.
93. Id.
94. Id.








"A party waives arbitration if it takes an action inconsistent with its
right to arbitration that is prejudicial to the other party.""'0 Because
Cottman took the case to trial before seeking arbitration, the court of
appeals held that Cottman "invoke[ed] the judicial process to [FVLR's]
detriment."10' Therefore, the court of appeals held that Cottman waived
its right to arbitration.102
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TRADEMARKS
A common fact scenario of unauthorized use of a franchisor's trade-
marks occurs when a former franchisee continues operations, using the
franchisor's trademarks, trade name, and trade dress, following a valid
termination of the franchise agreement. This Survey period was no ex-
ception. In Petro Franchise Systems, LLC v. All American Properties,
Inc.,103 Petro,which owned a system for the operation of full-facility
truck/auto travel centers, filed an application for preliminary injunction
based on an underlying action for trademark infringement. As
franchisor, Petro had a right to sub-franchise its affiliate's proprietary
marks. Petro granted franchises to individuals and businesses throughout
the United States, including Pennsylvania. Nevertheless, Texas law gov-
erned the franchise agreements.
In 2007, Petro's predecessor was acquired by Travel Centers of
America, LLC. Travel Centers operated five travel plazas under an affili-
ate brand within territory belonging to defendants All American Proper-
ties, Inc. and All American Plazas, Inc. Defendants claimed that "after
the acquisition, [the affiliated brand] began to integrate ... with the Petro
brand," which caused the value of Petro's brand to diminish.104 Defend-
ants claimed that this caused a decline in their business. 05 The parties
exchanged letters and ultimately entered into a "Confidential Settlement
Agreement and Mutual Release." 0 6 The release provided that $500,000
of escrow funds would be used to "cure the monetary default" of one of
the franchise agreements and "as advance payments for sums due Petro"
under the other franchise agreement. 107 The agreement released claims
between the parties to that date.
The escrow funds were applied to the franchise fees owed through
April 2008. Although defendants did not dispute that they failed to make
any payments for franchise fees after April 2008, defendants argued that
Petro "placed [them] in a position [to be] unable to pay those fees." 08
After Petro sent default notices for failure to pay the franchise fees, Petro
100. Id. at 380 (citing In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, 987 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Tex. 1999)).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 607 F. Supp. 2d 781 (W.D. Tex. March 23, 2009).
104. Id. at 785.
105. Id. at 787.





terminated the franchise agreements in late 2008.109 After termination,
Petro sued defendants for "trademark infringement, false designation of
origin, and dilution under the Lanham Act; unfair competition and unjust
enrichment; trademark infringement under Texas law; breach of contract;
and conversion." 10
Defendants did not contest ownership of the marks or that they contin-
ued to use the "marks in commerce and in connection with the sale, offer-
ing for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods." 1 Because
defendants not only used identical marks, but also requested that Petro
notify its consumers that defendants were still franchisees, the district
court held that consumer confusion was likely to be established. 112 "The.
parties' only dispute [was] whether [defendants'] use of the Petro marks
[was] authorized."1 13
Defendants argued that their trademark use was authorized unless
Petro proved that the franchise agreements were properly terminated.
The district court noted that it was unaware of any Fifth Circuit cases
addressing whether a franchisor must prove proper termination before it
may obtain equitable relief.114 Nevertheless, defendants claimed that
Petro breached the franchise agreements by improperly integrating its af-
filiates and Petro's brands. Petro argued that this claim was resolved in
the release, and, notwithstanding the release, Petro properly terminated
the franchise agreements. The district court concluded that the payment
requirements and termination procedure under the franchise agreement
were unambiguous. 1 5 Petro followed the termination procedures to the
letter.116 Also, the court concluded that defendants' actions in response
to Petro's alleged breach were not proper.117 "Treating a contract as con-
tinuing, after a breach, deprives the non-breaching party of any excuse
for terminating their own performance." 18 When Petro allegedly
breached, the court held that defendants had two options: continuing per-
formance or ceasing performance.11 9 Defendants did not exercise these
options. Moreover, the court held that defendants likely released their
counterclaims in the release.120 Therefore, Petro met its burden of prov-
ing that it would likely succeed on the merits.121 Because Petro met the




111. Id. at 788.
112. Id. at 788-89.
113. Id. at 789.






120. Id. at 791-92.
121. Id. at 792.
122. Id. at 801.
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In TGI Friday's Inc. v. Great Northwest Restaurants, Inc.,123 Friday's
initiated a trademark infringement action against its former franchisees.
Friday's sought a preliminary injunction against the franchisees for their
continued use after termination of Friday's trademarks and service marks
for restaurants located in California, Oregon, and Washington.
Through eleven separate franchise agreements, Friday's had a franchise
relationship with defendants. Friday's and defendants entered into the
franchise agreements between 1997 and 2006.124 The franchise agree-
ments granted standard authorization and provided for standard obliga-
tions. The franchise agreements permitted defendants "to use [Friday's]
trademarks and service marks in connection with the operation of [TGI
Friday's] restaurants."12 5 The franchise agreements provided that de-
fendants must cease use of the marks upon termination.126 The franchise
agreements also obligated defendants to pay monthly royalty and adver-
tising fees, for which Friday's could terminate if defendants failed to
pay.127
Defendants stopped paying their franchise fees in 2007. After a notice
of default and no fewer than seven deadline extensions, Friday's termi-
nated the franchise agreements through a termination notice dated De-
cember 18, 2008. The termination notice requested compliance with the
franchise agreement, including defendants' compliance with the post-ter-
mination obligations. Defendants did not abide by the termination obli-
gations of the franchise agreements. Defendants "continue[d] to use
[Friday's] marks and hold their restaurants out as TGI Friday's loca-
tions."128 Friday's action for violations of the Lanham Act and other
state law trademark infringement causes of action followed.129
The district court noted the standard for considering a preliminary in-
junction. Because it is an "extraordinary remedy," the district court held
that a preliminary injunction could be granted only if Friday's established
"(1) a substantial likelihood that it [would] prevail on the merits, (2) a
substantial threat that it [would] suffer irreparable injury if the injunction
[were] not granted, (3) that the threatened injury to it outweigh[ed] the
threatened harm the injunction may do to defendants, and (4) that grant-
ing the preliminary injunction [would] not disserve the public interest."' 30
The district court considered only whether Friday's Lanham Act claims
had a substantial likelihood of success.' 31
Defendants did not dispute several factors. They did not dispute that
Friday's owned the trademarks and service marks and that the marks
123. 652 F. Supp. 2d 763 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2009); see supra Part III.A-B.




128. Id. at 766-67.
129. Id. at 767 (noting that defendants asserted several counterclaims, but that those
counterclaims were not relevant to the district court's opinion).
130. Id.
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were legally protected. Defendants did not dispute their use of the marks
"in commerce in connection with the sale of goods." 132 Because defend-
ants used Friday's exact marks (just as they did while franchisees) and
without Friday's consent, the district court held that it was "evident that
there [was] a likelihood of consumer confusion between licensed TGI Fri-
day's restaurants and defendants' restaurants."' 3 3 The only disputed is-
sue was whether defendants were using the marks without Friday's
authorization.
Although defendants did not dispute that they failed to pay the re-
quired royalty and advertising fees and that Friday's adhered to the
proper termination procedure, defendants alleged that the "termination
of the [franchise] agreements [were] 'wrongful and improper."1 34 De-
fendants argued that Friday's was responsible for defendants' inability to
pay the royalty and advertising fees because the food distribution system
of Friday's was "discriminatory and cost-prohibitive."1 35 Defendants al-
leged that Friday's, through its changed distribution agreement, caused
defendants to pay higher freight charges since they were located a great
distance from the new distributor.136 Defendants argued that "because
[Friday's] choice of distribution system led to defendants' default" (by
failing to pay their royalties and advertising fees), Friday's "breached its
duty of good faith and fair dealing when it entered into [the new distribu-
tion] agreement."1 37 The district court rejected this argument.138
The district court held that defendants' argument "[did] not diminish
[Friday's] likelihood of success on its trademark infringement claim."139
Friday's agreement with the new distributor was a business decision that
Friday's made in 2000. Defendants "cite[d] no case law or precedent for
the proposition that a franchisee who is negatively affected by a business
decision of a franchisor . . . is excused from performing its contractual
obligations."1 4 0 Defendants offered no evidence for their "alleged distri-
bution-related issues until after they defaulted [under] the franchise
agreements." 1 41 The district court observed that defendants "negotiated
their own food distribution contracts" for approximately seven years
"without pursuing any claims or issues."142 Also, defendants' argument
was challenged by a forbearance agreement, whereby defendants pur-
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 768.
135. Id.
136. Id. (noting that defendants had uniform freight charges under the old distribution
system).
137. Id. at 769 (noting that although some circuits have addressed whether a franchisor
seeking injunctive relief is required to establish proper termination of the franchise agree-








portedly waived any distribution-related claims in 2007.143 Most notably,
the district court held that defendants' nonperformance was not excused:
[E]ven if defendants have a claim for breach of a duty of good faith
and fair dealing (and it is not clear that they do), this does not excuse
their nonperformance under the franchise agreements or render [Fri-
day's] termination of the agreements improper. Under Texas law,
which applies to the franchise agreements, if a defendant believed
that [Friday's] breached the contract, it had two options: continue to
perform the contract and sue for partial breach, or cease perform-
ance and treat the contract as terminated. A defendant could not
cease performing its obligations under the franchise agreement-
e.g., paying the franchise fees-while continuing to treat the agree-
ment as valid and enjoying the benefits granted under the agree-
ment- e.g., using [Friday's] marks. Also, any claims defendants
may have against [Friday's], including breach of contract or breach of
a duty of good faith and fair dealing, have no apparent effect on
[Friday's] right to terminate the agreements pursuant to their
terms.144
The district court concluded that Friday's had a right to terminate the
franchise agreements.145 Furthermore, although Friday's "continued to
inspect [the] restaurants, to send [defendants] menus and other promo-
tional materials, and to list defendants' restaurant locations on Friday's
website," the district court held that Friday's actions did not indicate any
waiver of termination or consent that defendants could continue to use
the marks.146 The district court concluded that Friday's had established a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its trademark infringe-
ment claims.147
The district court also found that Friday's had met its burden of estab-
lishing a substantial threat of injury if the injunction were not granted.148
The district court held that consumer confusion was evident.149 Defend-
ants argued that the court could not rely on consumer confusion to estab-
lish substantial threat of injury. The district court countered by observing
that the majority of circuits, including the Fifth, "ha[d] addressed [the]
issue and held that a court may presume irreparable injury upon finding a
likelihood of confusion in a trademark case."o50 Even without this pre-
sumption, the court found that Friday's had shown that defendants' pass-
ing off of their restaurants as TGI Friday'sTM restaurants, after
termination, caused Friday's to "los[e] control over its valuable trade-
marks and the quality of the restaurants operating under its name."' 5 '
143. Id.
144. Id. at 769-70 (internal citations omitted).
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The district court further held that Friday's "suffer[ed] a risk of injury to
its reputation and the value of its marks even if the alleged infringer of-
fer[ed] superior services."' 52
The district court concluded that Friday's harm outweighed any harm
that defendants may suffer.153 Unlike Friday's harm, defendants' harm
was not irreparable. If Friday's did not prevail at trial, the court con-
cluded that the harm caused by closing the restaurants was "calculable
and compensable through money damages."154 In evaluating the public
interest factor, the district court held that it considered a broader public
interest other than employees losing their jobs and local neighborhoods
and economies being hurt.'55 The public interest "promotes the protec-
tion of valuable trademarks and service marks in a capital-based econ-
omy that rewards success through competition."156 Accordingly, the
district court held that Friday's "satisfied all four requirements for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction" and granted Friday's application.' 57
V. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP, TERMINATION AND
NON-RENEWAL
Franchisors, franchisees and their attorneys await the outcome of arbi-
tration proceedings and litigation regarding the closure of General Mo-
tors and Chrysler dealerships and the termination of franchise
agreements in the spring and summer of 2009. Nevertheless, during the
Survey period there were significant developments in the law related to
franchise relationships in Texas.
A. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP
In Bellfort Enterprises, Inc., discussed above, a dealer successfully
sought remand of a case involving state-law claims.'58 Bellfort brought a
state court action against PetroTex alleging breach of contract, fraud,
negligent misrepresentation and unilateral rescission. PetroTex removed
the suit to federal court on the basis that the Petroleum Marketing Prac-
tices Act (PMPA) preempted the dealer's state-law claims because the
"PMPA protect[s] franchisees from arbitrary and discriminatory termina-
tion . . . of a franchise" agreement.159 PetroTex argued that Bellfort's
statement in its complaint-"PetroTex's refusal to deliver
motorfuel [was] arrogant and tantamount to putting Bellfort out of busi-
ness; and it did"-conceded that PetroTex had terminated the agreement
152. Id. at 772.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 773.
156. Id. (quoting Ramada Franchise Sys., 2001 WL 540213, at *3).
157. Id.
158. 339 F. App'x 416, 417 (5th Cir. 2009); see supra Part III.A, infra Part VII.B.




and that Bellfort's complaint invoked the PMPA.o60 The Fifth Circuit
concluded that Bellfort, as "master of its complaint," intended only to
raise a state-law breach of contract claim, and that Bellfort's request for a
declaratory judgment that the agreement be terminated would be incon-
sistent with a finding that PetroTex had already terminated the agree-
ment. 161 Because states are permitted to "regulate aspects of the
franchise relationship not affecting termination by a franchisor," the
PMPA did not preempt Bellfort's state-law claims.162
B. THE FAILURE TO PERFORM
In Archer Motor Sales Corp. v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.,163 the
district court granted Mazda's motion for summary judgment, because
Archer's claims were barred by statutes of limitations. In 1977, Archer
began to sell Mazda vehicles through a dealer sales and service agree-
ment. In 1986, Mazda informed Archer that it would offer the next
Houston area Mazda dealership to Archer. Instead, in 1990, Mazda of-
fered and awarded a new dealership to a different dealer. Archer quit
selling Mazda vehicles in 2002. In July 2004, Mazda approved a second
new Houston dealership. In October 2008, Archer filed its claims. The
court concluded that Mazda's failure to perform (by failing to offer
Archer the next Mazda dealership in Houston) occurred, if at all, in 1990,
when Mazda offered the "next" Houston-area Mazda dealership to an-
other dealer.'1" Thus, the limitations period had run long before Archer
filed its lawsuit.' 65
C. TERMINATION AND NON-RENEWAL
In Blackmon-Dunda v. Mary Kay, Inc.,166 the Dallas Court of Appeals
affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Mary Kay on all claims in a
suit brought by a former sales director following termination of her Inde-
pendent Sales Director agreement.167 The agreement permitted either
party to terminate upon thirty days' notice. 168 Mary Kay terminated the
agreement after Ms. Blackmon-Dunda twice used promotional materials
in violation of the agreement. Following termination, Ms. Blackmon-
Dunda sought commissions she believed she was owed by Mary Kay and
brought multiple claims against Mary Kay, including breach of contract,
deceptive trade practices and intentional infliction of emotional distress.




163. No. H-08-3587, 2009 WL 3012835 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2009).
164. Id. at *3.
165. Id.
166. No. H-08-3587, 2009 WL 866214 (Tex. App.-Dallas, Apr. 1, 2009, pet. denied).




agreement or an oral contract with Ms. Blackmon-Dunda.169 As to the
claim for breach of an oral contract, the court of appeals noted the agree-
ment's integration clause and concluded that Ms. Blackmon-Dunda's
claim, that Mary Kay breached an oral promise by its representation to
her and other business consultants that "by purchasing Mary Kay Prod-
ucts [they] were building [their] 'businesses' with sales volume and new
Consultants," to be without merit.170 Ms. Blackmon-Dunda was not enti-
tled to commissions for as long as her former sales unit was active, but
instead, for only so long as the agreement was in effect. 171 The agree-
ment specified that it was not transferable, and thus Ms. Blackmon-
Dunda could not assign or will her income stream from the agreement.
The court of appeals also considered Ms. Blackmon-Dunda's assertion
that a "special relationship" existed between her and Mary Kay which
thereby precluded summary judgment on her claim for breach of duty of
good faith and fair dealing , but the court found the assertion to be with-
out merit.172 The agreement clearly stated that Ms. Blackmon-Dunda
was an independent contractor and there is no authority to support a
finding that "an independent contractor has a special relationship with a
company for which it sells products."' 73 Similarly, the court of appeals
held that Mary Kay's refusal to allow Ms. Blackmon-Dunda to be a semi-
nar speaker could not support a claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.174 Finally, the court of appeals upheld summary judgment
on Ms. Blackmon-Dunda's Deceptive Trade Practices Act, claim since, as
Mary Kay's products did not form the basis of her complaint, she was not
a consumer for purposes of the Act.175
VI. COMMON-LAW CLAIMS
A. CONTRACT ISSUES
In Cottman Transmission Systems, L.L.C. v. FVLR Enters., L.L. C., 7 6 a
landlord sued its tenant's franchisor for breach of contract, promissory
estoppel, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. FVLR entered into a
ten-year commercial lease agreement, which contained a rider, with LBR,
L.L.C., in 2001. LBR was the franchisee of Cottman, a transmission re-
pair shop franchisor. Cottman was involved in the negotiations of the
lease and demanded that the rider-which gave Cottman the option to
assume the lease upon expiration or termination-be part of the lease.
The rider required Cottman to assume obligations and replace LBR as
lessee within thirty days of termination or expiration of the license agree-
169. Id. at *2-4.
170. Id. at *3.
171. Id. at *4.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at *5.
175. Id. at *6.
176. 295 S.W.3d 372 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
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ment between Cottman and LBR.'7 7
In March 2003, LBR moved out of the premises. FVLR informed
Cottman that LBR had abandoned the premises, and Cottman conse-
quently terminated its license agreement with LBR. Cottman took over
the premises and paid one month's rent. Although Cottman promised its
manager that it would pay the rent, Cottman did not pay any further rent.
Cottman moved out of the premises in May 2003.178
FVLR filed a lawsuit against Cottman, asserting causes of action for
breach of contract and promissory estoppel, among others. The jury
awarded judgment in favor of FVLR and granted damages of over
$175,000 for loss of rent payments, triple net charges, and advertising for
new tenants. Cottman appealed.17 9
Cottman argued that it was not bound by the lease or rider and that the
jury instruction on partial performance was flawed. On appeal, however,
Cottman did not "identify the language [it] wanted included in the in-
struction or explain the basis for its objection." 180 Therefore, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that "Cottman failed to preserve its [objection]
relating to the instruction on partial performance."181
The court of appeals noted that "the lease agreement and lease rider
[were] subject to the statute of frauds because they concern[ed] the lease
of commercial real estate for a period of greater than one year."182 Al-
though involved in the negotiations, Cottman did not sign the lease
agreement or the rider. At trial, FVLR relied on Cottman's alleged par-
tial performance as an exception to the statute of frauds. For actions to
constitute partial performance, the actions must be "unequivocally refer-
able" to the alleged oral agreement.183 Despite Cottman's objections, the
evidence supported a finding that Cottman partially performed.184 Cott-
man's president testified that Cottman was a beneficiary of the rider,
which gave it the option to assume the lease. Moreover, the rider did not
require Cottman to provide written notice to FVLR in order to assume
the lease. The court of appeals further held that Cottman's payment of
the rent for thirty days was a "good indication that Cottman was assum-
ing the lease."185 Cottman also entered into a management agreement
with its manager to operate the repair shop at the premises. In light of
this evidence, the court of appeals overruled Cottman's objections and
held that Cottman was bound by the rider.186
177. Id. at 375.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 375-76.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 377 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.021 (Vernon 2004)).
183. Id. (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Breezevale Ltd., 82 S.W.3d 429, 439-40 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2002, pet. denied)).
184. Id. at 379.
185. Id. at 378.




In Nears v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc.,187 former employee
Sharon Nears appealed the trial court's granting of a motion for summary
judgment in favor of Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc. and Six Conti-
nents Hotels, Inc. Nears originally filed a lawsuit in 2000 for wrongful
termination. She alleged that her immediate supervisor, Jack Marshall,
acted "toward her as an abusive and tyrannical martinet." 88 Holiday and
Six Continents filed separate but similar traditional and no-evidence mo-
tions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions, and
Nears timely appealed.189
In support of her wrongful-termination claim, Nears alleged that Mar-
shall was violent, drank excessively, and directed his anger toward her.
Nears claimed that she "experienced [several] stress-related health
problems as a result of Marshall's conduct."190 At the time Holiday filed
its motion for summary judgment, Nears alleged that Holiday was vicari-
ously liable for Marshall's actions, which caused Nears emotional distress.
Nears alleged that Marshall and Holiday's management company, ETEX,
were Holiday's agents, and that Holiday should be liable "based on
franchisor/franchisee liability, respondeat superior, and because Marshall
and ETEX were [Holiday's] independent contractors."191
Because Nears raised only the theory of actual authority in her sum-
mary judgment response, the Texarkana Court of Appeals initially de-
cided that it would not consider Nears's arguments of franchisor/
franchisee liability or respondeat superior liability.192 The court of ap-
peals, however, did note that the franchisor/franchisee liability theory,
which was analyzed "in terms of duty and breach of duty," was a "mark-
edly different analysis [from] that of agency based on actual authority."193
Nevertheless, the court did not address the theory on appeal.194
On appeal, Holiday argued that the trial court's granting of its motion
for summary judgment should have been sustained "because Nears's in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress claim [was] barred because it
[was] covered by a statutory remedy for unlawful retaliation."195 How-
ever, the court of appeals did not consider this ground.196 Holiday "did
not raise the issue of legal impermissibility of Nears's intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress claim in its motion for summary judgment,"
and thus the court of appeals did not consider that argument.197
187. 295 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2009, no pet. h.).
188. Id. at 789.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 790.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 791-92.
193. Id. at 792 n.4.
194. Id. at 792.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 793.
197. Id. at 792-93.
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The court of appeals evaluated the summary judgment evidence and
determined that Holiday "disprove[d] that any actual and/or apparent au-
thority of ETEX and Marshall existed."198 "An agent acting within the
scope of apparent authority binds a principal as though the principal per-
formed the action."199 The summary judgment evidence showed that
Holiday was not aware of the "material facts" that were the basis of
Nears's lawsuit. 200 No Holiday employee or representative oversaw the
management or inspection intricacies of the facility at which Nears
worked. The court of appeals held that no evidence existed that "would
lead a reasonably prudent person to conclude that [Holiday] had any con-
trol or right to control Marshall's conduct in any manner." 201
Nears, likewise, could not provide actual authority. Nears relied on the
standards manual promulgated by Holiday Inn Worldwide that required
all general managers, such as Marshall, to be certified through Holiday
Inn's training program. 202 The court of appeals, however, rejected this
argument. 203 The training program and standards set by Holiday were
"geared toward ensuring guest satisfaction, not toward the treatment of
hotel employees." 204 "Quality control standards for operating a franchise
should not be construed to create an agency relationship. The implemen-
tation of standards to ensure guest satisfaction in this case [did] not evi-
dence express or implied actual authority flowing from [Holiday] to
ETEX or Marshall pertaining to the treatment of hotel employees." 205
As such, the court of appeals held that there was no genuine issue of
material fact on the issue of whether Holiday expressly or impliedly dele-
gated authority to ETEX or Marshall to manage the hotel and control the
supervisory interactions with Nears. Therefore, the court of appeals sus-
tained the motion for summary judgment.206
VII. STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
Section 15.50 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code provides that
in order for a covenant not to compete to be enforceable, its restrictions
must be reasonable as to time, area, and the scope of the activity to be
restrained.207 In RE/MAX International, Inc. v. Trendsetter Realty, LLC,
a former employee of a RE/MAX franchisee, Deborah Miller, claimed
that a provision in her "Independent Contractor Agreement" with the
franchisee which stated that, upon termination of the agreement, she
198. Id.
199. Id. at 793.
200. Id. at 794.
201. Id. at 794-95.
202. Id. at 795.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 795-96.
205. Id. (internal citations omitted).
206. Id.
207. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon 2009).
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would not infringe RE/MAX's trademarks or imitate RE/MAX's meth-
ods of operation, was an unreasonable covenant not to compete. 208
Miller claimed that the provision at issue was overbroad, vague, and un-
reasonable in scope, duration, and area under the Texas Business and
Commerce Code.209
The district court stated that "a provision need not 'expressly prohibit'
competition" to fall under the statute.210 A nondisclosure agreement
alone is not a covenant not to compete under Texas law, so there must be
something else besides a nondisclosure provision to trigger the statute.211
The test is that the "practical and economic reality" of the provision must
inhibit competition in the same manner as a covenant not to compete. 212
The court interpreted the contract provision at issue in the case as similar
to a nondisclosure agreement, and therefore it was not subject to the stat-
ute.2 1 3 The court noted that the provision "[did] not prohibit Miller from
competing with RE/MAX for listings or clients." 214 The court stated that
the provision "[sought] to protect RE/MAX's business goodwill from
diminution by former agents who might mislead consumers into thinking
the agent [was] still affiliated with RE/MAX," and that this did not make
the provision a covenant not to compete. 215 Consequently, since the pro-
vision was not a covenant not to compete, the court did not need to ad-
dress the limitations of section 15.50 of the Business and Commerce
Code.216
RE/MAX therefore provides some clarification as to what types of fu-
ture employment restrictions may be placed in franchise agreements or
franchise employment contracts. The RE/MAX contract at issue did not
directly prevent Miller from competing with RE/MAX; rather, it pre-
vented her from doing so using RE/MAX's trademarks. 217 RE/MAX also
serves as a reminder that before a Business and Commerce Code "rea-
sonableness" analysis can be performed on a covenant not to compete,
the provision at issue must first actually qualify as such a covenant.
B. PETROLEUM MARKETING PRACTICEs AcT
In Bellfort Enterprises, discussed above, the Fifth Circuit held that the
PMPA did not entirely preempt plaintiff Bellfort Enterprises' breach of
contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and rescission claims against
208. 655 F. Supp. 2d 679, 718 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2009).
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 719.
212. Id. at 718-19 (citing Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haas, 818 S.W.2d 381, 385 (Tex.
1991)).







defendant PetroTex Fuels.218 Bellfort originally filed suit in state court,
claiming that PetroTex failed to follow through on certain financial incen-
tive promises it made prior to entry into the parties' motor fuel supply
agreement, and that PetroTex overcharged Bellfort on delivered fuel.2 19
PetroTex removed the case based on federal-question jurisdiction, claim-
ing that the PMPA preempted Bellfort's state-law claims.
The Fifth Circuit held that there was no federal-question jurisdiction,
because the PMPA did not completely preempt Bellfort's claims.220 The
Fifth Circuit stated that the purpose of the PMPA is "to protect franchis-
ees from arbitrary or discriminatory termination or nonrenewal of their
franchise." 221 PetroTex argued that Bellfort's complaint essentially al-
leged that PetroTex terminated the franchise agreement at issue, pointing
in part to Bellfort's requested declaratory judgment that the franchise
agreement be terminated. 222 However, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
Bellfort intended only to state a breach of contract claim and that
Bellfort's requested declaratory judgment was inconsistent with the posi-
tion that the franchise agreement had already been terminated. 223 There-
fore, the Fifth Circuit held that the face of the complaint did not present a
federal question.224
PetroTex's second argument was that under the "artful pleading doc-
trine," the PMPA completely preempted Bellfort's state-law claims.225
However, again, the Fifth Circuit stated that the PMPA's preemption pro-
vision "allows states to regulate aspects of the franchise relationship not
affecting termination by a franchisor." 226 Since the PMPA did not pre-
empt Bellfort's state-law claims, those claims could be pursued in state
court, and the action was not subject to removal.227
C. TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES-CONSUMER PROTECTION
ACT
In Momentum Marketing Sales & Service, Inc. v. Curves Int'l, Inc.,228 a
number of fitness-center franchisees sued their franchisor, Curves, and its
CEO, Gary Heavin, for fraudulent inducement and concealment, negli-
gent misrepresentation and omission, breach of contract, and alleged vio-
lations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act
218. Bellfort Enters., Inc. v. Petrotex Fuels, Inc., 339 F. App'x 416, 419 (5th Cir. 2009);
see supra Parts III.A, V.A. .
219. Id. at 417.
220. Id. at 419.
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228. Business Franchise Guide (CCH) 1 14,215 (W.D. Tex. Jul. 28, 2009). (Haynes and
Boone attorneys Deborah S. Coldwell, Iris Gibson, Altresha Burchett-Williams and Will
White serve as counsel for Curves International, Inc., and Gary Heavin).
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(DTPA). In an earlier ruling, the district court dismissed twenty-six of
the franchisees' thirty-one asserted claims in response to Curves' and
Heavin's motion to dismiss.229 As a result, the sole claim remaining
against the CEO was for alleged violations of the DTPA. Heavin moved
to dismiss on the basis that the complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. Heavin asserted that even if the allega-
tions were true, the franchisees failed to adequately allege that he vio-
lated any provision of the Texas "little FTC Act." The franchisees
asserted that Heavin waived his right to assert a second motion to dismiss
and, even if he did not, that they had adequately alleged a claim under
the DTPA.230
The district court ultimately held that Heavin could assert his motion to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), because
such a claim was not subject to the waiver provisions of Rules 12(g) and
12(h). 231 The court then ruled that the franchisees failed to allege that
the CEO engaged in any false, misleading, or deceptive acts or prac-
tices.232 In fact, the majority of the franchisees' allegations related to the
franchisor, not Heavin. "In the few paragraphs ... that [were] directed
specifically towards Heavin, [the franchisees] essentially allege[d] [he] in-
centivized his sales team to over-saturate the markets in which the [fran-
chisees] operate[d]." 233 The franchisees also alleged that Heavin "hired
friends as sales people, [employed] a friend as his attorney, and coerced
his sales team into signing a new commission agreement." 234 The court
noted that hiring friends as business associates was clearly not a false,
misleading, or deceptive act. 2 3 5 The court also noted that "[w]hether or
not coercing employees to enter into a new . . . employment contract"
was prohibited conduct under the DTPA, none of the CEO's employees
were plaintiffs in this action, making that allegation irrelevant.236 As to
the allegation that Heavin "incentivized" his sales team to over-saturate
the market, "[t]he establishment of a commission-based payment struc-
ture" or "requiring a sales force to perform to a certain level" were "not
unconscionable, fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading." 2 3 7 If doing so
were an actionable claim under the DTPA, "in addition to car dealer-
ships, Realtors and insurance agencies, law firms with minimum billable
hour requirements and bonus structures for attorneys who bring in busi-
ness could not practice in Texas without violating the DTPA." "Because
the only specific allegations against Heavin involve[d] his creation of a
229. Business Franchise Guide (CCH) 1 14,047 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2008); see also
Deborah S. Coldwell, Altresha Burchett-Williams, Will White & Suzie Loonam, Franchise
Law, 62 SMU L. REv. 1221, 1223-25 (2009).










commission-based pay structure for his sales team," plaintiffs' claim
against Heavin was dismissed.238 Finally, the franchisees' general allega-
tion in their complaint that the defendants' actions constituted deceptive
and unconscionable acts and practices was merely conclusory and did not
sufficiently allege a cause of action against Heavin.239
VIII. REMEDIES
A. COMPENSATORY
In Progressive Child Care Systems, Inc. v. Kids 'R' Kids International,
Inc., the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a jury verdict of over $1.3
million in damages in favor of a franchisor.240 The case centered on a
franchise to operate child care facilities in Plano, Texas, and Flower
Mound, Texas, under the "Kids 'R' Kids" name.241 The franchisee was
required to pay royalties of 5% of enrollment-based revenues to the
franchisor. The Plano franchise agreement became effective in 1995 and
the Flower Mound franchise agreement became effective in 1999. Both
franchise agreements had twenty-five-year terms. 242
Progressive stopped making royalty payments in March 2002 and be-
gan operating both franchises under the name "Legacy Learning Center"
in the spring of 2003.243 Kids 'R' Kids sued Progressive and its owners
for breach of contract, breach of personal guaranty, fraud, and conspir-
acy. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Kids R' Kids for $1,385,008.72
based on both future and past-due royalties. 244 The court of appeals ap-
plied Georgia law pursuant to the franchise agreements, noting that Texas
law provides that contractual choice-of-law provisions "will be given ef-
fect [as long as] the contract bears a reasonable relationship to the chosen
state" and public policy does not demand otherwise.245 The court of ap-
peals noted that Georgia, like Texas, had not specifically decided whether
a franchisee may be liable for past and future royalties after the termina-
tion of a franchise agreement.246 Progressive relied on Postal Instant
Press, Inc. v. Sealy, a California case wherein the court held that a
franchisor could not recover future royalties after the franchisor termi-
nated the franchise agreement. 247 On the other hand, the Progressive
court cited an unpublished Sixth Circuit opinion, American Speedy Print-
ing Centers, Inc. v. AM Marketing, Inc.,which held that a franchisor was
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. No. 2-07-127-CV, 2008 WL 4831339, at *2 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Nov. 6, 2008,
pet. denied).
241. Id. at *1.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at *2.
245. Id. (citing SAVA gumarska in kemijska industria d.d. v. Advanced Polymer Scis.,
Inc., 128 S.W.3d 304, 314 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.)).
246. Id. at *3.




entitled to future lost royalties after it had terminated the franchise
agreement for failure to pay royalties. 2 4 8 Moreover, the Progressive court
found it significant that in addition to merely not paying royalties, the
franchisee in this case independently withdrew from the franchise alto-
gether.249 The court of appeals concluded by holding that under tradi-
tional Georgia contract law, lost profits may be recovered as damages
under the principle that the injured party should be placed in the position
it would have occupied absent the breach.250 In conclusion, the Progres-
sive court held that the award of lost future royalties was adequately sup-
ported by Kids 'R' Kids' designated forensic accountant, who calculated
the amount based on the past performance of the two franchises pro-
jected throughout the remainder of their terms and discounted for pre-
sent value.251
Although Progressive applies Georgia law, the case is significant in that
it demonstrates how a court may analyze the law on whether lost future
royalties are available to a franchisor. The court of appeals in Progressive
ultimately distinguished the Sealy case, decided by a California court, and
relied on traditional contract damages, which generally can include lost
profits. 2 5 2 This analysis may prove instructive in other Texas courts tack-
ling the lost future royalties question.
Although not a franchisee-franchisor dispute, U.S. Bank v. American
Realty Trust, Inc. is significant in the area of franchise financing.253 The
dispute in U.S. Bank was between a former Holiday Inn franchisee and
its primary lender, which held a note secured by the real and personal
property of a former Holiday Inn hotel near the Kansas City airport.254
When the franchise term for the Holiday Inn was coming close to the end,
the franchisor required certain improvements to be made to the property
in order for the license to be renewed. An estimate revealed the cost of
these improvements to be approximately $1.8 million.255 Although the
parties disputed who made the decision, the Holiday Inn license was not
renewed, and the hotel was converted to a Clarion hotel at a lesser cost.
Occupancy and revenue subsequently declined, and the hotel was
foreclosed. 256
The loan from the lender was guaranteed by the franchisee. The guar-
antee included a provision making the franchisee personally liable for
"waste" committed on the property.257 The lender argued that waste oc-
curred as a result of the failure of the franchisee to relicense the hotel as a
248. Id. (citing Am. Speedy Printing Ctrs., Inc. v. AM Mktg., Inc., 69 Fed. App'x 692,
699 (6th Cir. 2003)).
249. Id. at *4.
250. Id.
251. Id. at *6.
252. Id. at *4.
253. 275 S.W.3d 647 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
254. Id. at 648-49.





Holiday Inn.258 The lender sought damages representing the difference
in appraisal value of the hotel under the cheaper Clarion brand in fore-
closure versus the value it would have had as a Holiday Inn, an amount
equal to about $3.85 million.259 The parties' primary argument was
whether "waste" in the loan documents could encompass intangible harm
to a license.
The Dallas Court of Appeals ultimately did not reach this issue, how-
ever. It found that the language requiring the franchisee to "conduct and
operate its business as presently conducted and operated" meant only
that the property had to continue as a hotel, not specifically as a Holiday
Inn.2 6 0 The court of appeals held that even if the franchisee made fraudu-
lent misrepresentations to the lender in connection with the decision not
to renew the Holiday Inn license, "the misrepresentations could not have
caused . . . damages for something [the franchisee] was not required to
do."261 U.S. Bank therefore teaches an important lesson for franchise
financing. If a particular brand is a valuable part of the collateral, a pro-
spective lender should be very careful in how the brand of the franchise is
addressed in the loan documentation.
B. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The Western District of Texas was faced with dueling applications for
preliminary injunctions in Petro Franchise Systems, LLC v. All American
Properties, Inc., discussed above.262 The fuel station franchisee com-
plained when the franchisor was acquired by a company that operated
competing travel plazas within the franchisee's exclusive franchise
area.263 This dispute, and the franchisees' non-payment of royalties, led
to an initial settlement agreement between the parties involving a release
of claims existing as of the date of the settlement agreement and a cash
payment to the franchisor to cure monetary defaults under the franchise
agreements. 264 After the initial settlement agreement, the franchisee
continued to fail to make royalty payments. The franchisor terminated
the franchises and sought a preliminary injunction under the Lanham Act
to prevent the franchisees from using the franchisor's trademarks. 265 The
franchisee counterclaimed for breach of the franchise agreement by the
franchisor and for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and
sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the franchisor from taking any
action to terminate the franchise agreements. 266
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 651. In addition, nothing in the loan documents specifically required the
franchisee to reapply for the Holiday Inn license. Id.
261. Id. at 654.
262. 607 F. Supp. 2d 781 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2009); see supra Part IV.A.
263. Id. at 785.
264. Id. at 786.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 787.
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The district court analyzed the four traditional factors in a preliminary
injunction analysis: (1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the pres-
ence of irreparable harm, (3) whether the threatened injury outweighed
any damage from the injunction, and (4) the public interest.2 6 7 The first
significant holding of the Petro case illustrates a classic contract-law anal-
ysis of franchise royalty payments. The court noted that the franchisee
was using the franchisor's exact trademarks and that there was no dispute
that the franchisee had failed to make required royalty payments.268 The
court noted that the franchisor followed the termination procedure under
the applicable franchise agreements "to the letter."269 The franchisee ar-
gued that the franchisor did not properly terminate the franchise agree-
ment because of its actions in allowing competing facilities to operate
within its exclusive area. 270 By properly following the termination proce-
dure after the franchisee stopped paying royalties, the franchisor estab-
lished a likelihood of success on the merits. 271 Petro, therefore, reinforces
that franchisees should take any decision to stop paying royalties very
seriously.
The second significant holding of Petro demonstrates the difficulty of
establishing irreparable harm. The district court found that, under estab-
lished trademark law, the franchisor would suffer irreparable harm if the
franchisee were allowed to continue using the franchisor's trademarks
without authorization. 272 Conversely, the court found that the loss of the
franchisee's franchise would not necessarily be irreparable harm.2 7 3 The
court cited as significant the fact that the franchisees, as part of the earlier
settlement, reneged on the opportunity to convert another one of their
facilities to the Petro brand.274 Further, the franchisees ran multiple
other facilities outside the Petro brand.275 Furthermore, the court stated
that even if the loss of the franchise meant that the franchisee would be
out of business, such loss may indeed be calculable and remedied by mon-
etary damages. 276 Petro consequently reinforces the advantages an intel-
lectual property claim has versus other types of claims in an irreparable
harm analysis, in that the unauthorized use of intellectual property can
easily qualify as irreparable harm, while in certain circumstances even the
loss of a business may be deemed compensable by monetary damages.
Finally, the franchisee argued that the franchisor had unclean hands as
a result of the acquisition which put competing facilities in the franchis-
ees' area under the franchisor's control. 277 In order for an unclean hands
267. Id. (citing Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 372 (5th Cir. 2008)).
268. Id. at 788-89.
269. Id. at 790.
270. Id. at 791.
271. Id. at 792.
272. Id. at 793-94.




277. Id. at 798-99.
604 [Vol. 63
argument to be successful, however, there must be a connection between
the allegedly unclean conduct and the injunction.278 In this case, the fran-
chisees failed to show how their failure to pay royalties was connected to
the unclean conduct.2 7 9 The district court stated that the franchisees did
not present enough evidence to prove that the competition from the com-
peting facilities impacted their ability to pay royalties. 280 The unclean-
hands holding reinforces the potential negative consequences of the fail-
ure to pay royalties. In conclusion, the court held that all of the relevant
factors favored the franchisor, and granted the franchisor a preliminary
injunction. 281
IX. CONCLUSION
As noted in the introduction, if there was a general theme among the
significant cases in franchise law this year, it was the reaffirmation of the
importance of the contractual nature of the relationship between fran-
chisees and franchisors. The importance of the contract was even reaf-
firmed in the procedural context, specifically in TGI Friday's Inc. v Great
Northwestern Restaurants, Inc. 2 8 2 The TGI Friday's court held that the
forum selection clause in the franchise agreement was broad enough to
encompass the plaintiff's intellectual property claims, and the court men-
tioned the personal-jurisdiction waiver in the franchise agreement as a
factor in holding that personal jurisdiction was proper in Texas as to an
out-of-state franchisee. 283 The holding in Davaco, Inc. v. Dunkin'
Brands, Inc. tempers this result slightly and reminds us that, at least when
it comes to jurisdiction, contracts alone are not enough.284
In the intellectual property area, in Petro Franchise Systems, LLC v. All
American Properties, Inc., the franchisor's intellectual property claims de-
pended on whether the franchisor had properly terminated the franchise
under the terms of the franchise agreement. 285 Since the district court
determined that the payment requirements and the franchise termination
procedure were unambiguous and properly followed by the franchisor,
the franchisor was held likely to prevail on its unauthorized use of intel-
lectual property claims.286 In fact, both Petro and Friday's reaffirm the
basic contract principle that if a defendant believes the other party to the
contract is in breach, it may continue to perform and sue for partial
breach, or cease performing and treat the contract as terminated. 287 A
278. Id. at 799.
279. Id. at 800.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 801.
282. Id. at 757-58, 760.
283. 652 F. Supp. 2d 750 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2009).
284. No. 3:08-cv-0581-m, 2008 WL 4975880, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2008) (stating that
a Texas choice-of-law provision does not establish jurisdiction absent the existence of tradi-
tional minimum contacts).
285. 607 F. Supp. 2d 781, 788-90 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2009).
286. Id. at 790-92.
287. Id. at 791; TGI Friday's, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 769-70.
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franchisee may not cease paying royalties while continuing to receive the
benefits of the franchisor's intellectual property. 288
In addition to the above, other cases this year demonstrate the impor-
tance of the contract in franchise-related disputes. In RE/MAX Interna-
tional, Inc. v. Trendsetter Realty, LLC, the district court held that a
nondisclosure agreement is not a covenant not to compete and is there-
fore not subject to the Business and Commerce Code's restrictions on
such covenants. 289 U.S. Bank v. American Realty Trust, Inc. shows that
even franchise financing documents should be carefully scrutinized dur-
ing drafting to account for potential future contingencies. In that case,
the court of appeals held that loan documents providing merely that a
hotel property must be conducted and operated as presently done was
not sufficient to guarantee that the property would have to remain a Hol-
iday Inn.2 9 0 Instead, the language permitted the franchisee operator to
shift to another brand that allegedly damaged the bank's collateral.
In summary, a theme of this year's franchise and dealership law is at-
tention to the plain meaning of contracts. The cases discussed above have
shown how important a topic this is in areas ranging from procedural
steps to substantive law issues and even in the transactional/financing
stage. Careful planning and forethought in the drafting and negotiation
phases is essential for both franchisors and franchisees and can have an
important impact on the outcome of any future disputes in which they
become involved.
288. Petro, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 790-92.
289. 655 F. Supp. 2d 679, 718-19 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 3, 2009).
290. 275 S.W.3d 647, 651 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
[Vol. 63606
